### 1

#### New sanctions won’t pass – democrats

Hooper 12-4 – Capitol Hill reporter for the Hill (Molly, “House bill would bash Iran deal”, December 4 of 2013, http://thehill.com/homenews/house/191986-house-bill-would-bash-tehran-deal)

“I think that we should have a sense of the House that we oppose the deal,” said Rep. Dana Rohrabacher (R-Calif.), a senior Foreign Affairs Committee member. Some Democrats would likely vote for such a measure, though Rohrabacher suspects “there are a lot of people on the Democratic side of the aisle who seem to feel compelled to support the administration on anything they possibly can, and this might fall within that range because you’ve got a Democratic president under attack.” More than a few Republicans, including Senate Minority Whip John Cornyn (Texas), have suggested the Iran agreement was timed to distract from the disastrous rollout of ObamaCare. It is unclear when the House will act on an Iran resolution; the lower chamber is scheduled to adjourn for the year at the end of next week.

LINK

#### PC key

Woods 11-25 – Newsmax political correspondent (Amy, “Obama Mounts 'Aggressive' Drive to Woo Congress on Iran Deal”, November 25 of 2013, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Obama-aggressive-Congress-Iran/2013/11/25/id/538641)

The White House is casting the nuclear agreement reached Sunday with Iran as part of a solution to conflict in the Middle East, and will push Congress to hold off issuing new sanctions on the country. The Wall Street Journal reported that President Barack Obama is launching an "aggressive campaign" against new sanctions and said such measures might throw off the deal reached in Geneva. Obama wants Congress to sit back for six months to let the agreement work. "Huge challenges remain," Obama said Monday during a speech in San Francisco. "But we cannot close the door on diplomacy, and we cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world's problems. Tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it's not the right thing for our security." Administration officials said Obama will speak at length about Middle East diplomacy when the president gives his 2014 State of the Union address. Democrats, including New York Sen. Chuck Schumer, and Republicans, including South Carolina Sen. Lindsey Graham, are eager to push for more sanctions out of distrust of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. "The Obama administration has managed, somehow, to bring the Arabs and Israelis together, and they may have created bipartisanship at a time when I thought it was impossible," Graham said. "The deal does not accomplish the goal of beginning to dismantle the [Iranian nuclear] program." While some congressional leaders are considering legislation that will impose sanctions six months from now, White House officials remain unsatisfied with that because it constitutes new economic punishment on the country that could threaten the treaty, NBC News reported.

#### New sanctions cause Iran war

WORLD TRIBUNE 11 – 13 – 13 [Obama said to suspend Iran sanctions without informing Congress, <http://www.worldtribune.com/2013/11/13/obama-said-to-suspend-iran-sanctions-without-informing-congress/>]

The administration has also pressured Congress to suspend plans for new sanctions legislation against Iran. The sources said the White House effort has encountered resistance from both Democrats and Republicans, particularly those in the defense and foreign affairs committees. “I urge the White House and the Senate to learn from the lessons of the past and not offer sanctions relief in return for the false hopes and empty promises of the Iranian regime,” Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee, said. “Instead, new rounds of sanctions must be implemented to gain further leverage because any misstep in calculations at this juncture will have devastating and irreversible consequences that will be difficult to correct retroactively.” On Nov. 12, the White House warned that additional sanctions on Iran would mean war with the United States. White House press secretary Jay Carney, in remarks meant to intensify pressure on Congress, said sanctions would end the prospect of any diplomatic solution to Iran’s crisis. “The American people do not want a march to war,” Carney said. “It is important to understand that if pursuing a resolution diplomatically is disallowed or ruled out, what options then do we and our allies have to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?” Still, the Senate Banking Committee has agreed to delay any vote on sanctions legislation until a briefing by Secretary of State John Kerry on Nov. 13. The sources said Kerry was expected to brief the committee on the P5+1 talks in Geneva that almost led to an agreement with Teheran. “The secretary will be clear that putting new sanctions in place would be a mistake,” State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said on Nov. 12. “We are still determining if there’s a diplomatic path forward. What we are asking for right now is a pause, a temporary pause, in sanctions.”

#### Iran war escalates

White, July/August 2011 (Jeffrey—defense fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, What Would War With Iran Look Like, National Interest, p. <http://www.the-american-interest.com/article-bd.cfm?piece=982>)

A U.S.-Iranian war would probably not be fought by the United States and Iran alone. Each would have partners or allies, both willing and not-so-willing. Pre-conflict commitments, longstanding relationships, the course of operations and other factors would place the United States and Iran at the center of more or less structured coalitions of the marginally willing. A Western coalition could consist of the United States and most of its traditional allies (but very likely not Turkey, based on the evolution of Turkish politics) in addition to some Persian Gulf states, Jordan and perhaps Egypt, depending on where its revolution takes it. Much would depend on whether U.S. leaders could persuade others to go along, which would mean convincing them that U.S. forces could shield them from Iranian and Iranian-proxy retaliation, or at least substantially weaken its effects. Coalition warfare would present a number of challenges to the U.S. government. Overall, it would lend legitimacy to the action, but it would also constrict U.S. freedom of action, perhaps by limiting the scope and intensity of military operations. There would thus be tension between the desire for a small coalition of the capable for operational and security purposes and a broader coalition that would include marginally useful allies to maximize legitimacy. The U.S. administration would probably not welcome Israeli participation. But if Israel were directly attacked by Iran or its allies, Washington would find it difficult to keep Israel out—as it did during the 1991 Gulf War. That would complicate the U.S. ability to manage its coalition, although it would not necessarily break it apart. Iranian diplomacy and information operations would seek to exploit Israeli participation to the fullest. Iran would have its own coalition. Hizballah in particular could act at Iran’s behest both by attacking Israel directly and by using its asymmetric and irregular warfare capabilities to expand the conflict and complicate the maintenance of the U.S. coalition. The escalation of the Hizballah-Israel conflict could draw in Syria and Hamas; Hamas in particular could feel compelled to respond to an Iranian request for assistance. Some or all of these satellite actors might choose to leave Iran to its fate, especially if initial U.S. strikes seemed devastating to the point of decisive. But their involvement would spread the conflict to the entire eastern Mediterranean and perhaps beyond, complicating both U.S. military operations and coalition diplomacy.

### 2

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### 3

**A. Discourses of danger reproduces an American identity – that posits the US as a the defender of global freedom and liberty**

**Campbell, 98**- Professor of International Politics University of Newcastle (David, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity)

The crisis of representation the United States faces is unique only in the particularities of its content. The form of the dilemma is something common to all states. The state has never been a stable ground on which a fixed identity has been secured against danger: the variety of state forms throughout modernity have always been a historically contingent panoply of practices that have served to constitute identity through the negation of difference and the temptation of otherness. With the intensification of state power in the late nineteenth century, Foreign Policy helped contain and discipline the identities to which foreign policy had given rise. In our late modern era, where we find proliferating challenges that cannot be readily contained within the state, the discourse of danger associated with the discursive economy of foreign policy/Foreign Policy will have to work overtime to overcome the ever present threats to the once stable representation of an always unstable sovereign domain. The discursive economy of foreign policy will thus be taxed in its efforts to reproduce and contain challenges to the political identity of nations such as the United States. However, for (the United States of) America— which I have argued is the imagined community par excellence, the state that requires a discourse of danger probably more than any other— the crisis of representation is particularly acute. The operation of anticommunism as a prominent discourse of danger in the United States throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries— with its ability to encompass the entire population, intensively structure the practices of everyday life, and offer a link between internal and external threats in ways that circumscribe the boundaries of legitimacy— is probably the best example of an effective discourse of danger. But with (as discussed in the Introduction) the globalization of contingency, the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse, reproducing the identity of "the United States" and containing challenges to it are likely to require new discourses of danger. Of course, talk of a shift from old to new discourses of danger drastically oversimplifies the complexity of this cultural terrain. Transformations of this kind do not occur in discrete or sequential stages, for there has always been more than one referent around which danger has crystallized. What appears as new is often the emergence of something previously obscured by that which has faded away or become less salient. In this context, there is no shortage on the horizons of world politics of potential candidates for new discourses of danger (such as AIDS, "terrorism," and the general sign of anarchy and uncertainty). Consider just one example. The environment has occasionally emerged as an international discourse of danger. For example, a focus on the environmental catastrophes of Eastern Europe has been prominent. 2 One of the effects of this interpretation has been to reinscribe East-West understandings of global politics in a period of international transformation by suggesting that "they" in the East are technologically less sophisticated and ecologically more dangerous than "we" in the West. This produces a new boundary that demarcates the "East" from the "West" in a period when the old frontiers of identity are no longer sustainable. But environmental danger can also be figured in a manner that challenges traditional forms of identity inscribed in the capitalist economy of the "West." As a discourse of danger that results in disciplinary strategies that are de-territorialized, involve communal cooperation, and refigure economic relationships, the environment can serve to enframe a different rendering of "reasoning man" than that associated with the subjectivities of liberal capitalism, thereby making it more unstable and undecidable than anticommunism. 3 The major issues regarding the possible emergence of a new discourse of danger(s) in this period can be indicated by some questions. In terms of the reproduction of American identity along the lines established in the cold war, will any of the likely candidates be as extensive or intensive as that which they are needed to replace? In other words, are we going to witness the persistence of cold war practices even after their most recent objects of contention have passed on? Will these practices be represented in the mode of the society of security? Or, alternatively, do any of the new dangers being focused on in this juncture contain the possibility for a different figuration of American identity that would diverge from the enmity of the cold war? These questions, dealing with the rewriting of security, inform the argument in the remaining chapters. To make the analysis more specific, the first task is to consider an issue that has been officially identified a danger or threat necessitating vigilance and defense in the (so-called) post-cold war world: the incidence of drug consumption in America. Before proceeding, an observation about the strategy of argumentation employed in this chapter is in order. It begins with a consideration of the claims of "fact" made by the policy discourses to support their articulation of danger. In discussing counterevidence, my intent is not to juxtapose one realm of fact with another. To the contrary, my desire is to demonstrate that within each realm of policy discourse it is possible to construct, in its own terms, a competing narrative that denaturalizes and unsettles the dominant way of constructing the world, thus prying open the space for an alternative interpretation concerned with the entailments of identity. Indeed, although I begin this chapter by operating largely within the terms of these policy discourses, I have attempted to politicize the terms of the debate. For example, instead of "the drug problem" or "drug abuse" I speak of "drug consumption"; instead of "drug users" or "addicts" I speak of "drug consumers" or "people addicted"; and instead of "drug traffickers" and "cartels" I speak of the "drug industry." Of course, no representation is neutral, and the terms of my discourse are certainly contestable, but their estranging quality is designed to help make obvious the way in which formulations of identity are sequestered within even the technical arguments of public policy with which we are most familiar. 4 As such, this consideration of contemporary discourses illustrates the relevance to the current period of the idea that foreign policy/Foreign Policy is constitutive of political identity.

**B. That makes extinction inevitable**

**Willson, 02**- Ph.D New College San Fransisco, Humanities, JD, American University (Brian, “Armageddon or Quantum Leap? U.S. Imperialism and Human Consciousness from an Evolutionary Perspective”, [**http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html**](http://www.brianwillson.com/quantum.html))

Awaiting the impending U.S. government's concocted "preventive" war against Iraq (indeed, against the world), this is perhaps one of the most frightening moments in human history. In a surreal scenario, the U.S. government is renewing active threats of using nuclear weapons and reviving use of anti-personnel land mines, and is introducing new technological weapons of death we can only imagine, and some we cannot. As grim as this scene is, I believe it must be the inevitable and logical extension of the continued growth ad nauseum of the American Way Of Life (AWOL) in particular, and the Western Way Of Life in general. Premeditated murder of thousands--perhaps millions--of innocents is the price for AWOL's insatiable consumption and its bloodthirsty vengeance, totally abdicating responsibility for lethal consequences to the planet and its species, including, ironically, our own. Perhaps Gaia is presenting the current transparent dangers to us as like a cosmic gift so that we might actually be able to *see* the extraordinary folly of our ways in time to creatively "storm the Bastille."U.S. Terrorist Roots U.S. civilization was founded on and has been sustained by terrorism, facilitated by Eurocentric racism, classism, and arrogant ethnocentrism. The grossest irony of all, of course, is that the "War on Terror," to be successful, must focus on our own civilization, the most egregious proponent of terror the world has even known. Terror was systematically utilized since our country's beginnings in the 1600s. The following instructions, facilitated by a cruel racism, are part of the historic record: "burning and spoiling the [Indian] country," (Captain John Underhill, Massachusetts Bay Colony, 1636); "put to death the [Pequot Indian] men of Block Island" (Massachusetts Bay Governor John Winthrop's order to Captain John Endecott, 1637); "laying waste," and instilling "terror...by any means" among the Indians (General George Washington, 1779); "[with] malice enough in our hearts to destroy everything that contributes to their support" (General John Sullivan, 1779).

In a prominent history book published in 1906 (*The History of the United States,* James Wilford Garner, Ph.D. and Henry Cabot Lodge, Ph.D, L.L.D), the "destruction" of the American Indian is explained as follows: "History teaches that inferior people must yield to a superior civilization....They must take on civilization or pass out. The Negro was able to endure slavery while learning the rudiments of civilization; the Indian could not endure slavery, and...refused to be taught." Attitudes uttered by white, Puritan, Christian men, civilian and military, thus set the tone for our civilization, sentiments that to this day have not been seriously renounced. We remain primarily a white male supremacy society with overtly expressed as well as suppressed sentiments of racism and classism dominating much of our political life and foreign policy. How can someone drop a bomb knowing that thousands of innocents will be murdered if the bomber is not possessed by cruel racism and/or ugly ethnocentrism? Conveniently left out of the historical record is the fact that our civilization has been founded on three holocausts, the first being theft of virtually all our land base at gunpoint while murdering millions of the original inhabitants. The second brought us "free" labor from Africa, but resulted in two-thirds of all those originally targeted for apprehension being murdered in the process of trying to escape or from being stowed as human cargo in slave ships known as floating coffins. The third holocaust took place during what the founder and publisher of *Time* and *Life* magazines, Thomas Luce, called "The American Century." This century witnessed more than 300 military and perhaps 10,000 covert interventions by the U.S. into more than 100 countries, stealing resources at gunpoint while murdering millions of the increasing numbers of impoverished people struggling for independence. "American exceptionalism" must succeed at *any* cost. In the process, the three Buddhist "poisons" are employed: greed -- for profit at any cost of human suffering; hatred -- of any obstacles to profit; ignorance -- of the intimate link between Western corporations/governments and "Third World" repressive regimes.  U.S. Oligarchy It does not matter which of the two parties, the republocrats or demoblicans, is in power. They both easily consented to the selection of their chief executive officer in violation of the rights of thousands of illegally disenfranchised Black voters, and of their Constitutional system itself that makes no provision for the Supreme Court to make such selection. Both believe in preserving the "national security" of AWOL, which means continued, unabated acceleration of extraction, consumption and pollution patterns, and obscene profits for the plutocrats and their bribed oligarchs in Washington. For all this to happen, Mr. Bush, indeed, has laid out the necessary plans for a world imperium to assure, in his and his cohorts' minds, continuation of our Western way of life, business- and profits-as-usual.  These oligarchs are not able to perceive the fact that further continuation of AWOL guarantees our destruction. They are not able to even consider the need for radical contraction and creative alternatives. They act as if blind drunk with their personal and political values of money and power, under the cloak of their disfigured version of Jesus. Unfortunately, the inevitable consequences of their business-as-usual forces are systematic destruction of virtually all sustainable ecosystems and human-created institutions.   Origins of "Civilization" Some history. As the revolution of urban civilization took root some 5,000 years ago the basic ingredients of "Western civilization" were introduced into our human evolutionary journey. The basic model of "civilization," for all but the most isolated and exceptional Indigenous groups, has seen the advent of powerful male oligarchs surrounded by elite bureaucracies of scribes and priests, overseeing hierarchies that involuntarily enforced large numbers of laborers, often violently captured during wars, to construct large projects for the pleasure of the king. Wars, systematic violence, and harsh class division originated with "civilizations." Secrecy of priestly knowledge about cosmic regularities and calendar-making assured that knowledge was monopolized by the small elite surrounding the oligarch. And the maxim, "the best defense is attack," was often used in early warfare, roots of our preventive strikes of today. According to Asian and Scandinavian scholars there have been nearly 15,000 wars during the last 5,000 years.   Extraordinarily Dangerous Trends The U.S. economy reveals increasing vulnerabilities to the fiction and hot air behind Wall Street and the continued exploitation and creation of misery upon which it is based. The U.S. regime has chosen to protect its illusion of omnipotence under the veil of fighting "terrorism" and its curtailing of civil liberties is similar to a police state. Increasingly desperate means used by people in power to maintain that power is a historically typical, predictable phenomenon. Never before, however, have oligarchs commanded so much power and possessed so many weapons of mass destruction, with explicit intentions to use such weapons preventively rather than defensively. I believe that we are at a pivotal point in history. We sit precariously perched on a ledge overlooking imminent extinction as a very real possibility at this juncture in our long, 7- to 8-million-year human evolutionary journey. Academics often talk about how history is cyclical, but two demonstrable trends, clearly not cyclical, indicate that we are dangerously near the end of our evolutionary branch

**C. Alternative text – reject the affirmative to desecuritize the Political. Vote negative to challenge securitization itself in favor of a political ethic that approaches problems in non-security terms and exposes the limits of their methodology.**

### 4

#### The United States Department of Defense should start a competitive procurement process to obtain a small modular nuclear reactor. The Nuclear Regulatory Committee should tailor existing regulations on licensing of small modular nuclear reactors that are compliant with non-proliferation guidelines and standards. The United States federal government should share the technology with Mexico.

#### Procurement solves --- it optimizes military applications and generates innovation in nuclear technology.

**Andres and Breetz**, February **2011** (Richard – Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College and senior fellow and Energy and Environmental Security and Policy Chair in the Center for Strategic Studies at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, and Hanna – doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations: Capabilities, Costs, and Technological Implications, p. 7-8)

DOD as First Mover Thus far, this paper has reviewed two of DOD’s most pressing energy vulnerabilities—grid insecurity and fuel convoys—and explored how they could be addressed by small reactors. We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors. On the other hand, failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD, which we review in this section: first, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries. By taking an early “first mover” role in the small reactor market, DOD could mitigate these risks and secure the long-term availability and appropriateness of these technologies for U.S. military applications. The “Valley of Death.” Given the promise that small reactors hold for military installations and mobility, DOD has a compelling interest in ensuring that they make the leap from paper to production. However, if DOD does not provide an initial demonstration and market, there is a chance that the U.S. small reactor industry may never get off the ground. The leap from the laboratory to the marketplace is so difficult to bridge that it is widely referred to as the “Valley Death.” Many promising technologies are never commercialized due to a variety of market failures— including technical and financial uncertainties, information asymmetries, capital market imperfections, transaction costs, and environmental and security externalities— that impede financing and early adoption and can lock innovative technologies out of the marketplace. 28 In such cases, the Government can help a worthy technology to bridge the Valley of Death by accepting the first mover costs and demonstrating the technology’s scientific and economic viability.29 Historically, nuclear power has been “the most clear-cut example . . . of an important general-purpose technology that in the absence of military and defense-related procurement would not have been developed at all.”30 Government involvement is likely to be crucial for innovative, next-generation nuclear technology as well. Despite the widespread revival of interest in nuclear energy, Daniel Ingersoll has argued that radically innovative designs face an uphill battle, as “the high capital cost of nuclear plants and the painful lessons learned during the first nuclear era have created a prevailing fear of first-of-a-kind designs.”31 In addition, Massachusetts Institute of Technology reports on the Future of Nuclear Power called for the Government to provide modest “first mover” assistance to the private sector due to several barriers that have hindered the nuclear renaissance, such as securing high up-front costs of site-banking, gaining NRC certification for new technologies, and demonstrating technical viability.32 It is possible, of course, that small reactors will achieve commercialization without DOD assistance. As discussed above, they have garnered increasing attention in the energy community. Several analysts have even argued that small reactors could play a key role in the second nuclear era, given that they may be the only reactors within the means of many U.S. utilities and developing countries.33 However, given the tremendous regulatory hurdles and technical and financial uncertainties, it appears far from certain that the U.S. small reactor industry will take off. If DOD wants to ensure that small reactors are available in the future, then it should pursue a leadership role now.

#### NRC regulations are modeled --- it’s the golden standard that other nations follow.

**Lovering et. al**, 9/7/**2012** (Jessica – policy analyst at the Breakthrough Institute, Ted Nordhaus – chairman at the Breakthrough Institute, and Michael Shllenberger – president of the Breakthrough Institute, Out of the Nuclear Closet, Foreign Policy, p. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/07/out\_of\_the\_nuclear\_closet?page=full)

Nuclear has enjoyed bipartisan support in Congress for more than 60 years, but the enthusiasm is running out. The Obama administration deserves credit for authorizing funding for two small modular reactors, which will be built at the Savannah River site in South Carolina. But a much more sweeping reform of U.S. nuclear energy policy is required. At present, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has little institutional knowledge of anything other than light-water reactors and virtually no capability to review or regulate alternative designs. This affects nuclear innovation in other countries as well, since the NRC remains, despite its many critics, the global gold standard for thorough regulation of nuclear energy. Most other countries follow the NRC's lead when it comes to establishing new technical and operational standards for the design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants.

### Adv 1

#### **Relations resilient**

USDS ’99 [12/23/99, US Department of State, “U.S. Department of State Background Note”, <http://www.infoplease.com/country/profiles/mexico.html>]

#### The scope of U.S.-Mexican relations goes far beyond diplomatic and official contacts; it entails extensive commercial, cultural, and educational ties, as demonstrated by the annual figure of nearly a million legal border crossings a day. In addition, more than a half-million American citizens live in Mexico. More than 2,600 U.S. companies have operations there, and the U.S. accounts for 55% of all foreign direct investment in Mexico. Along the 2,000-mile shared border, state and local governments interact closely.

#### Chavez’s death stabilizes Cuba now, no risk of collapse

Anya Landau French 13, Director of the New America Foundation U.S. – Cuba Policy Initiative, 3/6/13, “Can Cuba Survive the Loss of Chavez?,” http://thehavananote.com/2013/03/can\_cuba\_survive\_loss\_chavez

Not unsurprisingly, many in and out of Cuba now wonder if the loss of Chavez is the death knell of the Castros’ Revolution, or, perhaps could it inject urgent momentum into Raul Castro’s reform agenda, just in the nick of time? In some ways, the loss of Hugo Chavez, on its face so devastating for Cuba, might actually be a good thing for the island. With Nicolas Maduro a favorite to win the special presidential election a month from now, Cuba will likely retain significant influence. But Maduro is no Chavez. He’ll have to focus on building up his own political capital, without the benefit of Chavez’s charisma. While he surely won’t cut Cuba off, to maintain power he will almost certainly need to respond to increasing economic pressures at home with more pragmatic and domestically focused economic policies. And that likelihood, as well as the possibility that the Venezuelan opposition could win back power either now or in the medium term, should drive Cuban leaders to speed up and bravely deepen their tenuous economic reforms on the island. And if there was any hesitancy among Cuba's leaders to open more space between the island and Chavez, they now have the opportunity to do so. Under Raul Castro, Cuba has mended and expanded foreign relations the world over. Particularly if it shows greater pragmatism in its economic policies, countries such as China will no doubt increase economic engagement of the island. ¶ Raul Castro, who has at most five years – this second and final term as president - to save the fruits of the Cuban Revolution and chart a more sustainable course for the island, now has more incentive than ever to take the bull by the horns. Time will tell, perhaps sooner rather than later, whether he can.

### Nuke Leadership

#### military SMRs cause blowback and gut our nonproliferation agenda

Smith 11 (Terrence P., Program Coordinator and Research Assistant with the William E. Simon Chair in Political Economy – CSIS, “An Idea I Can Do Without: “Small Nuclear Reactors for Military Installations”,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2-16, http://csis.org/blog/idea-i-can-do-without-small-nuclear-reactors-military-installations)

What are the alternatives to small nuclear reactors (assuming we want to maintain a large oversees military presence)? The NDU report makes the point that the DoD has already been experimenting with “an array of initiatives on energy efficiency and renewable and alternative fuels.” But, according to the report, “unfortunately, even with massive investment and ingenuity, these initiatives will be insufficient to solve DOD’s reliance on the civilian grid or its need for convoys in forward areas.” While, to my knowledge, the DoD has not seen any huge relief from what I would call its token attempts at ‘going green,’ it hardly writes off the possibility of alternative energy supplies short of going nuclear. The report repeatedly emphasizes the point that “DOD’s “’first mover’ pursuit of small reactors could have a profound influence on the development of the industry,” and cautions that “if DOD does not support the U.S. small reactor industry, the industry could be dominated by foreign companies.” The U.S. nonproliferation agenda, if there is one, stands in opposition to this line of thinking. Pursuing a nuclear technology out of the fear that others will get it (or have it), is what fueled the Cold War and much of the proliferation we have seen and are seeing today. It is a mentality I think we should avoid. I do not mean to say this report ignores the risks. In fact they explicitly say, “We acknowledge that there are many uncertainties and risks associated with these reactors.” For example it says, Some key issues that require consideration include securing sealed modules, determining how terrorists might use captured nuclear materials, carefully considering the social and environmental consequences of dispersing reactors. The report also points out that “from a financial perspective, small reactors represent substantial losses in economies of scale.” These issues, which were briefly mentioned, hardly seem like small potatoes. The reports answer to the issues raised: “making reliable projections about these reactors’ economic and technical performance while they are still on paper is a significant challenge,” and “Nevertheless, no issue involving nuclear energy is simple.” On the other hand, the report argues, “failing to pursue these technologies raises its own set of risks for DOD.” “First, small reactors may fail to be commercialized in the United States; second, the designs that get locked in by the private market may not be optimal for DOD’s needs; and third, expertise on small reactors may become concentrated in foreign countries.” Yes these are important issue for a business stand, but I don’t find them to be the primary concern. The reactors are purely for energy purposes, but in a world that seems to be growing tired of U.S. military intervention, the idea of ensuring our ability to do so through the proliferation of mobile nuclear reactors will hardly quell any hostile sentiment. In addition, it can only add fire to the “nuclear = good” flame. So, while even under best case scenario, the reactors are completely proliferation proof and pose no direct threat to the nonproliferation cause (ignoring the spreading of nuclear tech and knowledge in general), I have a tough time seeing how it helps. The report concludes that the DoD “should seriously consider taking a leadership role on small reactors.” Since the 1970s, the report says, “in the United States, only the military has overcome the considerable barriers to building nuclear reactors. This will probably be the case with small reactors as well.” For now, the plans for small nuclear reactors are “unfortunately,” for the most part, “caught between the drawing board and production.”My point is, maybe that is where they should stay.

#### Russian nuclear expansion k2 economy – opens up massive energy exports

Daly 9 -- UPI Int'l Correspondent (John CK, 4/21/12, "Analysis: Russia's ambitious nuclear-power expansion plans," http://www.upi.com/Business\_News/Energy-Resources/2009/04/21/Analysis-Russias-ambitious-nuclear-power-expansion-plans/UPI-20531240328864/)

WASHINGTON, April 21 (UPI) -- The global recession has severely hammered the world's leading energy producers as oil has fallen from its July 2008 record high of $147.27 per barrel to slightly more than $50 a barrel today. For Russia, the world's second-largest oil producer, the news has not led to a reduction in production, as on April 16 its Energy Ministry issued a statement noting that it does not expect the country's 2009 crude oil output to fall this year from last year's rate of 9.735 million barrels per day. Declining oil prices have nevertheless played havoc with Russia's economy, which last year before the recession began had experienced a straight decade of growth averaging 7 percent annually since the 1998 fiscal crisis. Of Russia's 9.7 mbpd production, approximately 2.7 mbpd was consumed domestically, freeing about 7 mbpd for export. Even at depressed world prices, Russia relies on income from its oil and gas exports for a substantial portion of its budget revenues; accordingly, to free up hydrocarbons for export, Russia is looking to supply its future energy needs by increasing its nuclear-power program. The Russian Federation currently operates 10 nuclear power plants housing 31 reactor units, which supply approximately 16 percent of Russia's energy needs. Except for the Bilibino Nuclear Power Plant in eastern Siberia, the other nine complexes are all located in European Russia. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin is proposing a massive expansion of Russia's nuclear-power complex, which, if implemented, would effectively double the amount of Russian electricity generated by nuclear power. During an April 15 meeting on the development of the country's nuclear-energy program with Sergei Kiriyenko, head of Russia's State Atomic Energy Corp., Rosatom, at the Kalinin Nuclear Power Plant near Udomlya, about 120 miles northwest of Moscow, Putin said starkly, "We need to build 26 units." He added, "We have formed extremely ambitious, but fully realistic, plans. By 2030, the share of nuclear generation in (Russia's) overall energy production should total 25-30 percent. Today it's 16 percent. Taking into account the current situation, the realization of these plans requires special attention. It's clear that we need to look at how we are going to resolve this issue given the global economic and financial crisis. No matter what happens, we should fulfill the goal that I spoke of." Ironically, Putin's call for increased nuclear generation of electricity comes amid declining consumer demand, as Russians, in common with other depressed nations, have cut back on power consumption; according to the Russian Energy Ministry, demand for electricity could decline by about 4 percent by the end of the year. Putin, however, dismisses the dip as temporary, commenting, "Experts say that we'll reach the pre-crisis growth rates in power consumption of about 3 percent per year by 2012. I think that demand for energy resources will start to gradually increase once again in 2010, and by 2012 we will return to the pre-crisis growth rates in energy consumption." Putin is willing to back up his government's ambitions with financial resources, telling Kiriyenko that his administration would support the state nuclear corporation's request for nearly 50 billion rubles ($1.47 billion) in additional capitalization. Rosatom's investment program is currently 164 billion rubles ($4.83 billion); 73.3 billion rubles ($2.16 billion) is allocated from the federal budget, with 26 billion rubles ($766 million) in the form of loans. Despite Putin's largesse, however, Rosatom is facing financial difficulties, and Kiriyenko appealed to the prime minister for his organization to be able to issue bonds, saying, "The ability for infrastructure bonds is needed. We have prepared the corresponding proposal, but governmental (permission) is needed." In true capitalist fashion and in a not-so-subtle swipe at Russia's banks, Kiriyenko complained, "An obvious question is the loan interest rate. This is very important for the sector. The results of current talks with the banks indicate that even the most discounted rate will be about 16 percent annually. Building the nuclear plants at 16 percent interest is not possible. Ten percent is the maximum." Lastly, in a final flourish of salesmanship, the Rosatom boss urged that Putin push for swift approval of the federal program on new nuclear technologies aimed at development of a fourth generation of reactors, saying, "The program is ready, it has been agreed with everyone. In the near future the Economic Development Ministry will report on it to the government." One issue that apparently was not raised during the Kalinin discussions but permeates both Rosatom and the government's perceptions about the nation's nuclear program is that it is a source of foreign revenue, as nations considering nuclear-power generation look to Moscow for possible assistance. Worldwide, 30 countries operate 439 nuclear reactors for electricity generation, which collectively provide about 16 percent of the world's electricity production, while 11 nations are building 30 new nuclear-power facilities. Russia is eager to enter this market; while its involvement with Iran's Bushehr reactor is Russia's best-known nuclear diplomacy, Russia is also involved worldwide in the rush for nuclear business, from a tender to build reactors for Turkey's first nuclear power plant complex at Akkuyu on the Mediterranean to Nigeria. The ultimate potential prize, however, remains Russia's superpower neighbor China. Of China's 11 nuclear power plants, the oldest, Qingshan-1, only came online in 1991. While Western attention is focused on growing Chinese involvement in the global energy market, Beijing has already announced plans to spend $50 billion to build an additional 32 nuclear plants by 2020; Rosatom's involvement could generate far more revenue than issuing bonds in the deepest bear market in decades. Putin's ambitions notwithstanding, it is more than a little ironic that the world's second- and third-largest oil exporters, Russia and Iran, are pursuing nuclear-energy programs at a time when plummeting oil prices amid the global recession have tempered the global flush of enthusiasm of a year ago for nuclear power when oil prices hit record highs. Nuclear power has high capital costs and low variable costs, while with oil- and gas-fired plants, the opposite is true. In 2003 Massachusetts Institute of Technology Professor Ernest Moniz co-authored "The Future of Nuclear Power" and concluded that electricity generated by a nuclear plant was about 60 percent more expensive than power from traditional gas- and coal-driven plants and maintained several years later that there was no reason why the report's pricing conclusions would need to be changed substantially for today's market. Should Moniz's conclusions prove correct, then Kiriyenko is going to have to issue a lot more bonds in a crowded market, as last week Russian Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin said that Russia may raise foreign loans in 2010. Even worse, on April 14 Kudrin told a meeting of the Finance Ministry's collegiums, "We will have to revise the budget in 2010 to account for a projected drop in revenue of more than 30 percent compared with planned revenue this year," cutting Russian federal budget spending from 10.3 trillion rubles ($303.5 billion) to 9 trillion rubles ($265.1 billion). Things can only remain unsettled so long as the Russian government depends on energy revenues for the bulk of its income in the midst of a global recession. While estimates vary widely, both the International Monetary Fund and World Bank believe that hydrocarbon exports generate more than 60 percent of the Russian government's export revenues.

#### Nuclear warFilger 9 – Columnist and Founder – Global EconomicCrisis.com (Sheldon, 5/10/09, “Russian Economy Faces Disasterous Free Fall Contraction”, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sheldon-filger/russian-economy-faces-dis\_b\_201147.html)

In Russia, historically, economic health and political stability are intertwined to a degree that is rarely encountered in other major industrialized economies. It was the economic stagnation of the former Soviet Union that led to its political downfall. Similarly, Medvedev and Putin, both intimately acquainted with their nation's history, are unquestionably alarmed at the prospect that Russia's economic crisis will endanger the nation's political stability, achieved at great cost after years of chaos following the demise of the Soviet Union. Already, strikes and protests are occurring among rank and file workers facing unemployment or non-payment of their salaries. Recent polling demonstrates that the once supreme popularity ratings of Putin and Medvedev are eroding rapidly. Beyond the political elites are the financial oligarchs, who have been forced to deleverage, even unloading their yachts and executive jets in a desperate attempt to raise cash. Should the Russian economy deteriorate to the point where economic collapse is not out of the question, the impact will go far beyond the obvious accelerant such an outcome would be for the Global Economic Crisis. There is a geopolitical dimension that is even more relevant then the economic context. Despite its economic vulnerabilities and perceived decline from superpower status, Russia remains one of only two nations on earth with a nuclear arsenal of sufficient scope and capability to destroy the world as we know it. For that reason, it is not only President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin who will be lying awake at nights over the prospect that a national economic crisis can transform itself into a virulent and destabilizing social and political upheaval. It just may be possible that U.S. President Barack Obama's national security team has already briefed him about the consequences of a major economic meltdown in Russia for the peace of the world. After all, the most recent national intelligence estimates put out by the U.S. intelligence community have already concluded that the Global Economic Crisis represents the greatest national security threat to the United States, due to its facilitating political instability in the world. During the years Boris Yeltsin ruled Russia, security forces responsible for guarding the nation's nuclear arsenal went without pay for months at a time, leading to fears that desperate personnel would illicitly sell nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations. If the current economic crisis in Russia were to deteriorate much further, how secure would the Russian nuclear arsenal remain? It may be that the financial impact of the Global Economic Crisis is its least dangerous consequence.

#### **Military nuclear installments will be targeted for sabotage – causes accidents**

Wong 12 (Kelvin, Associate Research Fellow – S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, “Beyond Weapons: The Military’s Quest For Nuclear Power – Analysis,” Eurasia Review, 5-22, http://www.eurasiareview.com/22052012-beyond-weapons-the-militarys-quest-for-nuclear-power-analysis/)

Civilian And Military Nuclear Incidents Despite improvements in nuclear safety, public sentiment on nuclear power is generally unfavourable, particularly after a series of high-profile nuclear incidents over the years. Disasters like Chernobyl, Three Mile Island, and the recent Fukushima episodes have sorely demonstrated the perils of operating nuclear reactors, emanating be it from human error or natural calamities. Military forces have also been stung by peacetime nuclear incidents. In March 2008, the American nuclear submarine USS Houston leaked minute amounts of radiation into Sasebo naval base while on a port call, triggering condemnation from Japanese citizens in the district. In the same year, the British nuclear submarine HMS Trafalgar leaked hundreds of litres of radioactive wastewater into a nearby river while docked at Devonport naval base, raising concerns from nuclear safety experts. Mainstream Nuclear Power In The Military? Yet military scientists have not ceased to be tempted by the potential of nuclear power. In response to increasing oil prices and global supply uncertainties, and well-documented cases of logistical strain on forces operating in the Middle East in recent conflicts, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) issued a proposal for innovative solutions in deployable compact nuclear reactors in 2010. In the proposal, DARPA outlined the need to reduce the logistical burden of supplying forward operating bases and forces without access to reliable fuel supply lines. The proposal also suggested that materials science have advanced to the stage where it might have a positive impact on deployable nuclear reactor research. While recent developments suggest that nuclear power technology can potentially be employed in unmanned aircraft and on the ground, it is unlikely to have mainstream military utility. The Cold War period was an era when general attitudes towards nuclear energy were quite favourable, and military experimentation was only limited by funding and scientific expertise. In contrast, nuclear power today has become a hotly debated issue despite its importance in powering the economies of advanced nations today. For the military, the problem with nuclear power is not just about cost and safety, but also of the nature of its operating environment. Deploying volatile nuclear reactors into harm’s way on the battlefield, where their destruction and sabotage are likely, should give military planners cause to pause.